Not All Plain Sailing
The Highs and Lows of Iran’s Scramble for the Horn of Africa
“Commerce, religion, and conquest wove different parts of Africa and Asia into an intricate tapestry at various points in history”
– Verhoeven, 2020
Why should you care about Iran’s Africa policy and African countries’ reaction to it? In a recent publication I tried to offer a preliminary answer by focusing on Iran’s post-1979 presence in the Horn of Africa and dissecting the objectives behind it.
Research on extra-regional powers in Africa is generally focused on, if not obsessed with, Chinese and European actors, largely overshadowing interactions with Arab, Persian, and Turkish players, which often predate the former. Even when it does focus on (West) Asian countries, though, it hardly ever covers Persian/Iranian actors, despite the fact that, even today as in the past, they have often been a key variable influencing other external players’ engagement with Africa.
Not only. Such analyses often fall into a sort of new-scramble narrative trap (Soulé, 2020) where much focus is placed on foreign powers’ actions, yet little to nothing on African countries’ (re)action to them — as if they were passive objects in such interactions. But, without downplaying major asymmetries and constraints that some African countries clearly have and display in their international relations, eventually they do make choices. And although it is tough to steer clear of this trap, it is crucial to portray African countries’ own calculations too, within a more Africa-centered assessment of these relations (Reid, 2021). In this regard, this contribution tried its best to challenge the simplistic notion that Horn and other African countries are merely passive peripheral actors in the engagement with external actors.
The use of scramble in the title, which may well evoke colonial times (the phrase “Scramble for Africa” was reportedly coined in 1884 by The Times to describe the contention between European powers for a share of Africa), does not intend to fuel this notion that Africa (or parts of it) can only be an object of geopolitical contention rather than an agent , but just to reconnect it to the (small) literature and readership on West Asian powers’ competition in Africa and especially the one tackling Iran, which often uses this phrase (see Lefebvre, 2019).
Once Upon a Time
The story about Iran’s presence in Africa, especially in the wider Eastern Africa and its Horn, dates back centuries (and so does that of East Africans in Iran). The cultural traces of Iranians’ ancient presence in Africa can still be found in today’s local toponymy and way of life. Persian festivities like Nowruz are still celebrated in parts of East Africa, while many local toponyms including Zanzibar (the coast of the blacks), Mogadishu (the throne of the shah, according to some etymological interpretations), and Benadir (the harbour) are all rooted in Persian words as they were influenced if not given by Persian-speaking communities living or working in the area. Swahili and Persian languages share a lot of everyday vocabulary too. Ask the shah/sheha (tribal chief) drinking chai/chai (tea) and eating berenj/birinzi (rice dish) together with his boz/mbuzi (goat) in the bostan/bustani (garden) near the bandar/bandari (port). It is not surprising, after all, that a “language of the coast” (the word kiswahili –which is a modified plural form of the Arabic sāhel, coast– literally means that in Arabic) has borrowed many words from other languages (Persian, as well as Arabic, German, English, and Portuguese, just to name the most relevant ones) of overseas communities it got into contact with over the centuries.
The past often informs the present, in the language and elsewhere, and so the chapter could not miss a brief historical background — especially touching upon the fascinating story of the friendship between Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi and Haile Selassie (Steele, 2021). Until the late 1960s, Ethiopia was the only sub-Saharan country Iran had diplomatic relations with. But in the 1970s they were extended to more than 30 countries across the whole Africa, mostly for oil-funded economic development partnerships. The warming of relations between Iran, Africa, and Ethiopia in particular, were best displayed at the celebrations for the 2500th anniversary of the Persian empire held in Persepolis 50 years ago, an event in which the “most sought after man in town” was not the Shah but Ethiopia’s Emperor Haile Selassie.
Dissecting Iran’s Post-1979 Africa Policy
Brief historical excursus aside, the chapter focuses on the post-1979 era. Among specialists, Tehran’s post-1979 approach to the region is often known as “southern strategy” (Amelot & Gardet, 2011) or “Irafrique” (Korinman, 2010). Whichever the name, it came under the spotlight especially in the past two decades as a result of Ahmadinejad’s much-hyped Africa push but, in a more subtle way, the Islamic Republic had been very active in the region for much longer. Shortly after the revolution, it began projecting its power abroad in order to break the feeling of isolation and otherness it came to experience even more than before after it became an Islamic Republic. Encircling the rival monarchies of the Arabian peninsula and developing its own influence in Africa and beyond has since been devised as a way to mitigate the long-standing strategic loneliness derived from its very peculiar political, ideological, and religious configuration. Hype aside, it effectively gained definitive momentum after 2005, during Ahmadinejad’s years of stark confrontation with Western powers on nuclear enrichment rights, with the establishment of new partnerships and a more intense maritime presence in the Horn region. This, in turn, triggered its rivals’ own reactions in the region.
Focusing on the Horn, the chapter explains that Iran’s Horn policy is guided by a complex and sophisticated strategy where state, state-affiliated, and non-governmental entities have been involved, and multiple instruments used. It comprises at least four different dimensions and related objectives, all to some degree useful to break the isolation Iran has long been grappling with. First, it is a strategy which works towards building political partnerships proper, by reaching out especially to African countries holding seats and votes in international fora and which can be aptly leveraged to get much-needed support in regional and international diplomatic contexts. Second, it is related to the establishment of a military presence at sea and on land, in order to monitor the lucrative trade flows passing through the Bab el-Mandeb strait, to provide military support to local affiliated groups, and to contain and deter the Arab regional competitors which, in their own backyard, have been doing the same and even more to establish new partnerships. Third, besides political and military influence, Iran’s Horn strategy also consists of investing in cultural, scientific, and humanitarian cooperation, by means of scholarships, specialised education institutes, cultural and religious centres, as well as humanitarian organisations. Finally, along a fourth, economic dimension, Iran’s Horn strategy also aims to develop stronger trade relations with local partners, as a way to find new, promising markets where to promote its economic-commercial interests especially at times in which its exports are severely affected by Western-led sanctions.
Main Themes of the Chapter
The chapter is divided into various sub-sections which explain these dimensions of Iran’s Horn policy (through a theoretical lens which combines international systemic factors and domestic policy processes as explanatory variables of states’ foreign policies) and chronologically analyse the evolution of the ties between Horn countries and the Islamic Republic of Iran after 1979. The main themes addressed throughout the chapter include the early post-1979 “revolutionary” connections with Turabi’s Sudan; foreign power’s “waltz with Bashir” following his frequent changes of foreign partnerships in Sudan’s post-Turabi years; Ahmadinejad’s Africa push (2005–2012) which increased Iran’s trade flows, security partnerships, and diplomatic presence in Africa, sparking mayhem especially in Tel Aviv and in the Persian Gulf capitals; Rouhani’s post-2015 Africa retrenchment. It aims to debunk some myths about Iran’s capabilities to control the region. Some major limits did and will constrain the Islamic Republic’s ‘scramble’ for influence in that region and Africa as a whole. Yet, this does not imply that it is all gloom and doom for Africa-Iran relations. The chapter wraps up by assessing the chances for a return to stronger ties under Iran’s Raisi administration.
Regarding his ideological position in the domestic political environment, Raisi is definitely not the new Ahmadinejad. Yet, because of some similarities the two share (see IRGC/Sepah’s representation share in cabinet appointments under their administrations in Figure 3), he is expected to relaunch Ahmadinejad’s Africa playbook. Which will imply stronger trade ties with African countries — including military imports-exports, see the Ethiopian case below — but also the return of the Eastern African land and sea at the centre of escalation cycles involving Iran, Israel, and the Gulf’s Arab monarchies.
You, Me, and Israel
Mind you, the chapter is on Iran’s Horn policy and yet Israel features prominently in it. This is because East Africa and the Red Sea have long been the playground of Iran-Israel indirect confrontation. In the Red Sea, more than a dozen vessels bound for the Mediterranean have reportedly been targeted by Israeli forces in the recent years, allegedly to disrupt Iran’s proxy network in the Arab Levant more than to enforce sanctions evasion according to US officials, but only a few have come under the spotlight. Among them, which are listed in the map above, was the attack against Iran’s MV Saviz intelligence ship deployed off the Eritrean coast. Forward base ships like Saviz helped Iran sustain and resupply its forces abroad, kilometres away from the Persian Gulf, as a (safer) alternative to land-based options after diplomatic ties with Eritrea, Sudan, and Somalia broke down after 2015/2016, both following Saudi Arabia’s pressure and own domestic considerations. As a result of the escalation of attacks we already witnessed in 2019–2020, in 2021 the Chief of Staff of Iran’s Armed Forces Gen. Baqeri announced the resumption of the IR navy (IRIN)’s patrolling missions in the Red Sea, pushing Israel to further step up its presence and hold the first joint naval exercise with regional Arab navies. Israel’s own shipping lanes through the Arabian Sea were hit by a series of attacks in 2021 in what many interpreted as a maritime tit-for-tat between Iran and Israel.
Tensions between Iran and Israel did not spare the East African mainland either. In 2021 alone, (mostly) Israeli media circulated new stories about the existence of Iran-linked networks of local African and Iranian citizens who were gathering intelligence, if not planning attacks proper, against Israeli (but also Emirati) individuals and facilities in Nairobi, Addis, and Khartoum. These rumours renewed media interest in Iran’s Africa presence. Hype and headlines aside, employing intelligence and surveillance techniques in foreign countries is not a prerogative of the Islamic Republic of Iran, though. Countries spy on each other all the time. And Israel’s growing role in the region resulting also from its newly thawed relations with some Arab countries further incentivises Iranian intelligence surveillance there.
Debunking Some Myths
The chapter also discusses some other sensitive topics that generally get more and easier attention in the media. Concerning the multifaceted interaction between Iran and Somalia, the chapter addresses the issue of foreign vessels’ illegal fishing in Somali exclusive waters, which is one of the causes of Somali piracy too, and of the alleged relationship between Iran and al-Shabaab, drawing on several GITOC studies on the proliferation in Somalia of arms related to the Yemeni conflict through local arms dealers. Together with Saudi and Emirati weapons, in Somalia GITOC documented the presence of rifles that had reportedly originated in Iranian arms shipments organised for the Houthis through transnational maritime trafficking networks (the latest was seized on Christmas eve), and were later rerouted to Somali markets. These findings show evidence of the spillover of small arms and ammunition from the Yemeni conflict into Somalia and the broader East Africa region, but not of Iran’s direct support to al-Shabaab. Several reports of the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia also provide evidence of the involvement of Iranian non-state entities in the Somali charcoal illegal trade, which is claimed to help fund also al-Shabaab. But, just as much as Emirati entities are involved in this too, these findings only prove Western Asian powers’ violation of the embargo, falling short of substantiating claims that Iran directly funds al-Shabaab. Iran’s relationship with the al-Qaeda galaxy remains odd: late 2020 reports about the killing of the al-Qaeda mastermind of the 1998 East Africa bombings Abu Muhammad al-Masri in Tehran, where he allegedly resided, gave way to speculations about Iran being “al Qaeda’s new home base”, but more cool-headed responses and explanations make much better sense of Iran and al-Qaeda’s relationship to everyone who is willing to get to the bottom of the issue.
Ethiopia “Special” Relationship
Another episode renewing the interest in Iran’s Africa presence and policy was the alleged military support to Ethiopia in 2021. The chapter, which was submitted just as the Tigray war broke out in November 2020, describes Ethiopia as the launching base from which Iran could rebuild its Horn relations given that it is the only Horn country preserving diplomatic ties with it after that in 2015/16 all the other Horn countries cut diplomatic ties with Tehran. Claims that Iranian-linked violent attacks in Addis were truly under consideration as a retaliation to Israel’s late 2020 killing of Fakhrizadeh seem implausible against this background.
Addis-Tehran commercial ties (mostly based on agricultural and manufacture exports) have remained steady over the past decade although they never stood out (with regard to trade, Ethiopia’s regional competitors such as Egypt, Kenya, and Sudan fared much better). 2021 and Ethiopia’s Tigray civil war brought a new military dimension in the Iran-Ethiopia equation which had been missing in their relationship since the 1980s Iran-Iraq war, when the then Ethiopian regime of the Derg emerged as one of the few international actors offering weapons to a militarily isolated Iran. Although over the past two decades Ethiopia has purchased most of its weaponry from countries like Russia, Ukraine, and China, the Ethiopian federal government has recently diversified more the acquisition of arms and equipment, including by approaching Iran.
While official data (see SIPRI) does not capture this recent trend (yet), at least fifteen flights connecting Iran and Addis’ airports in August-December 2021 have been tracked by OSINT analyst Gerjon, allegedly contributing to supplying the Ethiopian federal forces with armed drone capability (together with China, UAE, and Turkey) in the Tigray War. According to OSINT analysis (Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans are leading on this), in addition to Chinese Wing Loong I and Turkish Bayraktar TB2 UAVs the Ethiopian federal forces have acquired Iranian Mohajer-6 UCAVs. They have been spotted around Semera together with their ground control station and recent discoveries of Iranian Ghaem-5 precision-guided munition far from the Tigrayan battlefronts may indicate Mohajer-6 have also been deployed to Asosa to conduct operations over the Oromia region too. On top of this, Ethiopia also maintains close military ties with Israel for armament imports of different kinds and intelligence services, thus “benefitting” from a curious quartet of arms/drones suppliers — Israel, Iran, Turkey, and the UAE — which haven’t always got along with each other pretty well.
While, against this background, Iran cannot expect to forge any “special relationship” with Ethiopia (like it used to be at the time of the Shah), it can yet count on Addis as a pragmatic partner which prides itself on being free from any foreign patron’s control (today as in colonial times) and for this will hardly yield to their requests to engage only with whom they prefer (see Gulf powers’ pressures on Sudan and Somalia to close Iranian embassies instead).
The chapter is available for in-library consultation and (some) external loans via UNIMI MINERVA
If you still don’t have access to it through your library or university credentials, let’s get in touch via Researchgate: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/354548937_Not_All_Plain_Sailing_The_Highs_and_Lows_of_Iran's_Scramble_for_the_Horn_of_Africa
